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Abstract
The present study explored the relationship between risky cybersecurity
behaviours, attitudes towards cybersecurity in a business environment, Internet
addiction, and impulsivity. 538 participants in part-time or full-time employment in
the UK completed an online questionnaire, with responses from 515 being used in
the data analysis. The survey included an attitude towards cybercrime and
cybersecurity in business scale, a measure of impulsivity, Internet addiction and a
‘risky’ cybersecurity behaviours scale. The results demonstrated that Internet
addiction was a significant predictor for risky cybersecurity behaviours. A positive
attitude towards cybersecurity in business was negatively related to risky
cybersecurity behaviours. Finally, the measure of impulsivity revealed that both
attentional and motor impulsivity were both significant positive predictors of risky
cybersecurity behaviours, with non-planning being a significant negative predictor.
The results present a further step in understanding the individual differences that
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may govern good cybersecurity practices, highlighting the need to focus directly on
more effective training and awareness mechanisms.
Keywords: Psychology
1. Introduction
In 2010 the British Government assigned the growing threat from Cybercrime a
“Tier One” status, its highest level of concern (HMSO, 2010). In the same year, a
report published by The Symantec Corporation (LaBrie et al., 2010) noted that
globally, 65% of adults had fallen victim to some form of cybercrime. The
economic cost of breaches in cybersecurity has also been noted, with an estimated
cost of between £75,000 and £311,000 for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), this figure rising to between £1.46 m and £3.14 m for larger organisations
(HM Government, 2015). The current research is presented alongside this alarming
rise in cybercrime. The key aim is to provide an exploration of how individual
differences serve to influence employee’s engagement in information security
behaviours.
Human factors in the context of information security has begun to gain increased
attention, particularly where the use of security technologies have failed to protect
companies from cyberattacks (Anwar et al., 2016; Herath and Rao, 2009a, [4_TD$DIFF] b). The
use of such technologies is negated in instances where employees fail to follow
cybersecurity protocols or engage in activities that place themselves and the
company at risk. It is from this perspective that the growth in research exploring
the role human factors play in information security has been born (Herath and Rao,
2009b). Research has found that employees consistently underestimated the
probability of falling victim to a cybersecurity breach (Herath and Rao, 2009a).
Herath and Rao (2009b) further argued that organisational, environmental and
behavioural factors all serve to influence the extent to which employees adhere to
cyber security practices.
1.1. Personality traits and cybersecurity
Some attempts have been made to explore how individual differences in
personality traits can impact on a person’s adherence to cybersecurity procedures.
For example, Shropshire, Warkentin, Johnston, and Schmidt (2006) initially
proposed a link between the intent to comply with information security protocols
and the traits of agreeableness and conscientiousness. McBride et al. (2012) also
noted that individuals who are more extraverted were more likely to violate
cybersecurity polices in comparison to more neurotic and conscientious
individuals. Shropshire et al., 2015 found that the intent to use a new piece of
security software and actual use was also mediated by conscientiousness and
agreeableness. However it should be noted that this last piece of research focused
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on a cohort of students aged between 18–21, potentially limiting the extension of
these findings to a work-based population. The researchers also noted a general
discrepancy between behavioural intent and actual behaviour, further exacerbating
the capacity to predict security compliant behaviours (Shropshire et al., 2015).
Additional work exploring the link between personality traits and susceptibility to
attacks has been included in pioneering work by Uebelacker and Quiel, (2014).
This work examined the link between susceptibility to social engineering attacks
and key personality factors. Social engineering is viewed as the use of
manipulation, persuasion, and influence by an attacker to obtain sensitive
information or access to restricted areas (Uebelacker and Quiel, 2014). Uebelacker
and Quiel, (2014) presented a theoretical framework based on a comprehensive
literature review that made direct links between the Big Five Personality traits (see
John and Srivastava, 1999) and susceptibility to social engineering. The authors
suggested that individuals exhibiting traits such as conscientiousness, extraversion,
openness to experience, and agreeableness were highly susceptible to social
engineering attacks. In contrast, further studies exploring information security
behaviours have noted that conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to
experience were linked to lower risk taking and higher information security
awareness scores (McCormac et al., 2016). This discrepancy in findings further
highlights the potential benefits of conducting more research to examine the impact
aspects of personality have on information security behaviours.
One personality trait that has been focused on within the research surrounding
information security behaviours is that of impulsivity. Impulsiveness has been
defined as “the urge to act spontaneously without reflecting on an action and its
consequences” (Coutlee et al., 2014; p. 2). Research has shown that individuals
who exhibit higher levels of impulsivity are less risk adverse when compared to
those with lower levels (Coutlee et al., 2014; McCoul and Haslam, 2001;
Zuckerman and Kuhlman, 2000). Coutlee et al. (2014) also noted trait impulsivity
is a component of a wide number of clinical conditions such as ADHD, borderline
personality disorder and impulsive control disorders. Recent work has also
established links between impulsivity and aspects of information security
awareness. For instance Egelman and Peer (Egelman and Peer, 2015b) explored
the link between impulsivity and information security using their own Security
Behaviours Intentions Scale (SeBIS). This scale examined awareness and
engagement in good cybersecurity practices, including the use of different
passwords for different accounts, verifying the authenticity of links before they
follow them and keeping software up-to-date. Findings from this research showed
that impulsivity was negatively correlated to security behaviours, presenting the
potential for this trait to predict risky cybersecurity behaviours.
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Welk et al. (2015) assessed the impact of individual differences on participant’s
capacity to discriminate between legitimate emails and phishing emails. A phishing
email typically involves some form of social engineering tactic with the attacker
purporting to be an official source in an attempt to elicit personal information such
as account login details (Welk et al., 2015). Welk et al. (2015) noted that measures
of personality and impulsivity acted as significant predictors of detecting a
phishing email. Individuals who scored higher on measures of extraversion and
anxiousness performed significantly poorer on detecting phishing emails. Aspects
of impulsivity including reservation, calmness, and the capacity to keep emotions
under control were also positively correlated with the accuracy in detecting
phishing emails. Those who were rated as being more reserved, calmer and have
the capacity to keep their emotions in check had better detection rates for phishing
emails (Welk et al., 2015).
Tischer et al. (2016) examined the potential for individuals to plug in USB devices
that had been littered around a university campus. This process is often seen as a
key mechanism of infiltration used by social engineers who will leave such devices
in prominent places in an attempt to gain entry to highly protected systems (Tischer
et al., 2016). Often such devices will be laden with malicious software allowing the
social engineer remote access to system once they have been plugged into a
computer connected to the Internet. In contrast to Egelman and Peer’s work,
Tischer et al. (2016) found that individuals who were more likely to plug in a USB
device were no more risk loving when compared to a matched sample. In fact those
individuals who did plug in the USB were more risk averse in all categories apart
from that of recreational risk. It does appear that these individuals devolve
responsibility for their protection to the computer and security measures deployed
on it, or are ignorant of the risks attached to poor cybersecurity practices (Tischer
et al., 2016). Tischer et al. (2016) also used the SeBIS, but noted that the internal
reliability of the scale was found to be much lower than had originally been found
in the original research by Egelman and Peer (2015b). As there appears to be a lack
of clarity in the research literature about the impact trait impulsivity has on both
attitudes and behaviours in the context of information security, the present research
aimed to examine this further. It is proposed, based on the previous findings from
research, that impulsivity will significantly predict adherence to information
security protocols.
1.2. Internet addiction and computer abuse
Internet addiction has garnered a great deal of attention over the past two decades,
with many arguing for it to be classified as a pathological disorder. (Griffiths,
1998; Griffiths, 2000; Young, 1998). Griffiths (2000) suggested that the concept of
Internet addiction is potentially a misnomer, and is an umbrella term that actually
masks other technological addictions fuelled by access to the Internet. These could
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include aspects of addiction to email (Marulanda-Carter and Jackson, 2012), online
gaming (Kuss et al., 2012; Ng and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), and social networking
(Karaiskos et al., 2010).
To date there have been no explicit attempts to link Internet addiction to the
potential to engage in risky cybersecurity behaviours. Most of the research
examining the impact of Internet addiction in the workplace has focused on aspects
of lost productivity (Greenfield and Davis, 2002; Young and Case, 2004). A
potential link between Internet addiction and Internet abuse has been mention in
the research literature, with Griffiths (2010) noting that although related, these
concepts are not the same. Stanton (2002) previously made the suggestion that
Internet abuse in the workplace is a natural extension of activities related to
Internet addiction. Accordingly, Rosen (2010) claimed that the new iGeneration of
workers believe that they have the right to be online at all times, irrespective of if
they are in work or not. Aspects of Internet abuse are not without an associated
cost, and can lead to the clogging of computer networks as well as increasing the
incidents of security breaches within an organisation (Pee et al., 2008; Weatherbee,
2010). Chen et al. (2008) noted that unethical use of the Internet within the
workplace had the potential to develop into cybercrime, including aspects of
intellectual property theft, distributing offensive material and online piracy. [5_TD$DIFF]Panko
(2010) also noted that users could cause a variety of issues through computer abuse
and misuse, such as inadvertently downloading malicious code or visiting
compromised websites. Further work is deemed necessary to establish exactly
how aspects of technology addition link into poor cybersecurity behaviours and in
turn if such a metric could be used to help organisations target training more
effectively. It is suggested that those individuals exhibiting a compulsive use of the
Internet will be inclined to take more risks in order to get online, and as a result be
less compliant with accepted protocols.
1.3. Aims and objectives
The focus for this study is to explore if trait impulsivity, Internet addiction and
attitudes of employees towards cybersecurity serve to predict the frequency of
engaging in risky cybersecurity behaviours. The inclusion of an attitude scale
serves to act as a metric against which the behaviour of individuals can be
examined, as well as providing the capacity to measure change over time. From
this regard, the attitude scale has the potential to be particularly useful when
exploring the impact intervention strategies have on knowledge and awareness of
cybersecurity within a variety of settings. By concentrating on those individuals in
employment it is hoped that findings could be used to develop strategies to prevent
lapses in business cybersecurity. The current study will also explore the potential
for individual differences in impulsivity and Internet addiction to act as predictors
for risky cybersecurity behaviours. Building on the research reviewed above the
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tentative suggestion is that Internet addiction and impulsivity will act as significant
positive predictors for more frequent engagement in risky cybersecurity
behaviours. In the instance of attitudes towards cybersecurity, it is suggested that
a negative attitude towards cybersecurity and cybercrime in business will be
associated with to higher levels of risky cybersecurity behaviours.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were recruited via an online questionnaire using Qualtrics Research
Panel, and were paid a small honorarium for their participation. In total a total of
538 participants completed the survey, with an age range of 18 − 84, comprising of
218 Males and 297 Females. All participants were in employed work (either Part-
Time or Full-Time) and based in the UK.
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Abbreviated impulsiveness scale (ABIS)
A shortened 13-item impulsivity scale presented by Coutlee et al. (2014) was used
to counter the potential for participant response fatigue. Items are scored on a scale
of 1 (Never/Rarely) to 4 (Almost Always/Always), with possible scores ranging
from 13–52. The ABIS consists of three sub-scales, namely Attention, Motor and
Non-planning. Coutlee et al. (2014) reported Cronbach’s α of 0.80, 0.82, and 0.71
respectively for each of these sub-scales.
2.2.2. Online cognition scale (OCS)
Davis et al. (2002) presented a 36-item scale that is designed to explore aspects of
excessive Internet Use. The scale has exhibited a high level of internal consistency
with a Cronbach’s α of 0.94. Scores on the OCS range between 36 and 252, with
the upper level being indicative of problematic Internet use.
2.2.3. Risky cybersecurity behaviours scale (RScB)
Partially based on the SeBIS (Egelman and Peer, 2015a, b) a scale was created
with input from Digital Forensic investigators and Law Enforcement. It included
behaviours that had led to companies being attacked as a result of poor
cybersecurity practices. The questionnaire asked participants to rate, on a scale of
0–6 (where 0 = Never and 6 = Daily), how often they engaged in the specific
behaviour during a previous 6-month period. Items included ‘Sharing passwords
with friends and colleagues’, ‘Using the same password for multiple websites’, and
‘Using an online storage system to exchange and keep personal or sensitive
information’. The final scale included 20 items, with possible scores ranging from
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0–150. Higher scores on the RScB were indicative of the individual engaging in
more risky cybersecurity behaviours. In the present study, for the 20-item scale an
overall Cronbach’s α of 0.823 was achieved, indicating a high level of reliability.
The full list of items for this scale is shown in Table 1.
2.2.4. Attitudes towards cybersecurity and cybercrime in business
(ATC-IB)
The scale was constructed to reflect a wide spectrum of attitudes towards both
cybersecurity and cybercrime within a business context. The scale was constructed
using expertise from the Police, Digital Forensics, Criminal Psychology and
Cyberpsychology. A final scale consisting of 25 items was used in the study and
consisted of items such as ‘I don’t have the right skills to be able to protect the
organisation from cybercrime’. The scale was scored using a 4-point Likert scale;
(4) Strongly Disagree, (3) Disagree, (2) Agree, (1) Strongly Agree. A high score on
the ATC-IB scale indicated a positive engagement in cybersecurity, where as a
lower score indicated a negative attitude and lower engagement. Scores on the
Table 1. Scale Items for the Risky Cybersecurity Behaviours Scale (RScB).
Item
1 Sharing passwords with friends and colleagues.
2 Using or creating passwords that are not very complicated (e.g. family name and date of birth).
3 Using the same password for multiple websites.
4 Using online storage systems to exchange and keep personal or sensitive information.
5 Entering payment information on websites that have no clear security information/certification
6 Using free-to-access public Wi-Fi
7 Relying on a trusted friend or colleague to advise you on aspects of online-security.
8 Downloading free anti-virus software from an unknown source.
9 Disabling the anti-virus on my work computer so that I can download information from websites.
10 Bringing in my own USB to work in order to transfer data onto it.
11* Checking that software for your smartphone/tablet/laptop/PC is up-to-date.
12 Downloading digital media (music, films, games) from unlicensed sources
13 Sharing my current location on social media.
14 Accepting friend requests on social media because you recognise the photo.
15 Clicking on links contained in unsolicited emails from an unknown source.
16 Sending personal information to strangers over the Internet.
17 Clicking on links contained in an email from a trusted friend or work colleague.
18* Checking for updates to any anti-virus software you have installed.
19 Downloading data and material from websites on my work computer without checking its authenticity.
20 Storing company information on my personal electronic device (e.g. smartphone/tablet/laptop)
* Indicates reverse scored items.
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ATC-IB could range from 25–100. Cronbach’s Alpha for the original 25-item scale
was .744, and showed that three items had poor inter-item correlations (items 11,
12 and 24). The removal of these items increased Cronbach’s Alpha to .80,
indicating a high level of reliability. The full list of items for this scale is shown in
Table 2.
2.2.5. Ethical considerations
This project was reviewed and approved in accordance with the operational
procedures for De Montfort University’s Faculty of Health and Life Sciences
Research Ethics Committee (ref. 1605). Participants were informed of their right to
Table 2. Scale items for the Attitudes towards Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Questionnaire (ATC-IB).
Item
1 I think that management have the responsibility to ensure a company is protected from cybercrime
2* I am aware of my role in keeping the company protected from potential cybercriminals.
3 I believe everyone in the company has a role to play in protecting against threats from cybercriminals.
4 It is hard to know how I can help protect the organisation from cybercrime.
5 I don't have the right skills to be able to protect the organisation from cybercrime.
6 I do not feel that IT security is a priority within my organisation.
7 Computer systems provide all the protection a company needs.
8 I think that reporting cybercrime is a waste of time.
9 The Police lack the capacity to deal with cybercrime effectively.
10 I believe that cybercriminals are more advanced than the people who are supposed to be protecting us.
11 I think that information provided by the Government and Police on cybercrime is not relevant to businesses.^
12 I feel that the Police are far too busy to deal with cybercrime.^
13 I worry that if I report a cyberattack to the Police it might damage the reputation of the company
14* I think more could be done to communicate the risks from cybercrime to individuals in the organisation.
15* I am aware of the company's IT use policy and attempt to follow it.
16 I would not know how to report a cyberattack if one happened.
17 I don't think that reporting a cyberattack on the company is my responsibility.
18 I don’t pay attention to company material about the threats from cybercrime.
19* I am confident that I would be able to spot the signs of a cyberattack.
20* I think the biggest threat for IT systems comes from people within the company.
21* I feel that any individual within the company are at risk of manipulation from confidence tricksters.
22 I think that cybercriminals only target a company when there is a substantial financial gain.
23 I believe only large companies are targeted by hackers and cybercriminals.
24 I feel that only companies that take payments using online systems are at risk of being victims of cybercrime.^
25 I don't think I know who is responsible for protecting the company from cybercrime.
^Indicates items that were omitted from the final scale due to poor inter-item correlation.
* Indicates items that were reversed scored.
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withdraw from the survey at any point, activated by clicking a ‘withdraw now’
option presented on each page. Clicking this option presented participants with a
full debrief screen detailing the aims and objectives for the study and further
contact details of the researcher. Participants indicated their informed consent by
clicking on an option at the end of the information sheet detailing that they had
read all the relevant information and were happy to continue.
2.2.6. Data collation
Of the 538 participants who completed the survey, a total of 23 were omitted from
the final analysis due to incomplete information. The remaining dataset contained
responses from 515 respondents.
For the RScB, two items were reverse scored (items 11 and 18). In the instance of
the ATC-IB, 6 items were reversed scored (2, 14, 15, 19, 20 and 21). The OCS
contained one reverse-score item (12). For each of these scales, a total score was
calculated.
For the ABIS scale, adding the relevant items together and averaging the responses
calculated the three subscales. For the first scale of attention, items 5, 8*, 9*, 12*
and 20* were included. Motor impulsiveness includes items 2, 14, 17 and 18.
Finally Non-planning impulsiveness included items 1*, 7*, 13* and 26*. All items
indicated by an asterisk were reversed scored. As researchers such has (Coutlee
et al., 2014) argued against the unidimensionality of impulsivity a total score was
not calculated, but instead each scale was treated as a separate element.
3. Results
Table 3 provides the means and SDs for all measures alongside the correlations
between the variables. Examinations of the distributions for each variable using
histograms and P-P plots suggested that data could be treated as normal.
Table 3. Correlations, means and standard deviations for key variables.
Mean SD Imp Attention Imp Motor Imp Non-Planning ATC-IB OCS
Imp Attention 2.07 0.52 –
Imp Motor 2.03 0.58 .36** –
Imp Non-Planning 2.33 0.61 .60** .14** –
ATC-IB 60.19 7.31 -.24** -.24** -.11* –
OCS 119.30 37.44 .21** .35** .00 -.40** –
RScB 27.72 14.81 .15** .30** -.30 -30** .36**
** p < 0.01 Level (2-tailed).
* p < 0.5 Level (2-tailed).
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3.1. Internet addiction and attitudes towards cybersecurity on
risky cybersecurity behaviours
A hierarchical regression was conducted to see if the two predictors of Internet
addiction and attitudes towards cybersecurity predicted risky cybersecurity
behaviour scores. Based on research by Griffiths (2010) and Stanton (2002),
Internet addiction was entered in the first step, and attitudes towards cybersecurity
entered in the second.
The Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.896, suggesting that independence of errors
could be assumed, and values of tolerance and VIF suggested that multicollinearity
was not a concern (VIF average = 1.19, tolerance average = .840). Collinearity
diagnostics indicated no multicollinearity.
Model 1 presented a statistically significant fit to the data, (F(1, 513) = 78.074, p
< .001, R2 = .132, R2Adjusted = .130) explaining 13% of the variance in risky
cybersecurity behaviours. Model 2 was also a good fit to the data, (F(2, 512) =
49.279, p < .001, R2 = .161, R2Adjusted = .158) with the additional predictor
explaining an additional 3% of variance.
As can be seen in Table 4, Internet Addiction and Attitudes towards Cybersecurity
both presented as significant predictors towards risky cybersecurity behaviours.
3.2. Impulsivity and risky cybersecurity behaviours
A second regression was conducted in which all of the impulsivity subscales were
entered simultaneously. The value of the Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.939,
suggesting that independence of errors could be assumed, and values of tolerance
and VIF suggested that multicollinearity was not a concern (VIF average = 1.49,
Table 4. Linear model for OCS and ATC-IB as predictors of Risky Cybersecurity
Behaviours.
B SE B β p
Step 1
Constant 6.572 2.034 .001
OCS .144 .016 .363 .000
Step 2
Constant 32.888 6.532 .000
OCS .144 .017 .289 .000
ATC-IB -.379 .089 -.187 .000
Note. R2 = .0.132 for Step 1; R2 = .161 for Step 2.
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tolerance average = .690). Collinearity diagnostics also indicated no multi-
collinearity. The linear model for the regression is presented in Table 5.
The model presented a statistically significant fit to the data, (F(3, 511) = 18.130, p
< .001, R2 = .096, R2Adjusted = .091) explaining 9% of the variance in risky
cybersecurity behaviours.
4. Discussion
The current study aimed to explore potential variables that could serve to predict a
higher frequency for engaging in risky cybersecurity behaviours. The results
present a preliminary step into exploring human factors within cybersecurity.
There is the potential for certain predictors to provide a mechanism for identifying
those who may be more susceptible to engage in cyber-related risky behaviours.
Each of these will now be discussed in turn.
4.1. Attitudes towards cybersecurity and risky cybersecurity
behaviours
One of key findings from the current research is that employee attitudes towards
cybersecurity were negatively correlated to the frequency with which they engaged
in risky cybersecurity behaviours. The capacity to instil good cybersecurity
behaviour should be viewed as being of paramount importance for all
organisations, irrespective of their size and complexity. However, it is apparent
that from the responses to the attitude scale this is not the case, with pockets of
individuals appearing to be disengaged or ill equipped to act appropriately. Some
98% of those questioned devolved responsibility of company cybersecurity to
management, with a further 58% stating they did not know how they could protect
the company from cybercrime. One analogue to this is found in Tischer et al.
(2016), who noted that certain individuals appear to devolve aspects of their
security to computer systems. In the context of the present study the concept of
‘computer systems’ may also extend to include other aspects of the work-based
Table 5. Linear model for ABIS Subscales as predictors of Risky Cybersecurity
Behaviours.
B SE B β p
Constant 9.307 3.173 .004
Attention 3.727 1.598 .130 .020
Motor 6.642 1.154 .261 .000
Non-Planning -2.902 1.274 -.120 .023
Note. R2 = .0.096.
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environment, including system administrators and management. It would appear
that these are the people who individuals believe have a direct responsibility for
prevention from cyberattacks. It would also appear that those individuals who are
dismissive or are ignorant to the threats from poor cybersecurity are more likely to
engage in risky cybersecurity behaviours. It is unclear if this is due to a complete
disregard for information security or the belief that technology-based security
measures will protect an individual from cybercrime, and provides a route for
further empirical study. One of the key reasons for employing the use of an attitude
scales in research of this nature is that, given the capacity for attitudes to change
over time, it provides a good metric to examine if interventions have served to alter
knowledge and perceptions (Shropshire et al., 2006).
4.2. Internet addiction and risky cybersecurity behaviours
The extent to which individuals engage in risky cybersecurity behaviours also
appears to be closely linked to the level of problematic or addictive Internet use
they exhibit. At the heart of behavioural addiction is the drive to engage in the
addictive behaviour, which goes above all else and dominates the individual’s
thoughts, feelings and behaviours (Giffiths, 2010). This concept of ‘salience’ may
be one potential element of the addictive complex that overrides a capacity to
engage in good cybersecurity behaviours. Griffiths (2010) discussed the capacity
for Internet addiction to lead to aspects of Internet abuse within the workplace,
with the present study representing one of the first to link the potential impact on
the cybersecurity of the organisation. In very early work of this nature, Stanton
(2002) had suggested that there was the potential for a small proportion of
employees who were addicted to the Internet to also abuse Internet access at work.
In the context of the present study Internet addiction is not presented as a potential
screening tool to isolate individuals in order for punitive action to be taken.
Researchers such as Young and Case (2004) suggested that caution should be
exercised when attempting to punish individuals who exhibit problematic Internet
use in the workplace. By doing so, the employer could be creating even wider
issues, and they advise support and the provision of potential routes to therapeutic
interventions as a more effective approach.
4.3. Impulsivity and risky cybersecurity behaviours
The three subscales included in the ABIS all presented significant predictors for
risky cybersecurity behaviours. Attentional and Motor impulsivity both presented
as significant positive predictors for risky behaviours. Based on past research it is
assumed that those with high levels of impulsiveness often act without reflection
and pay little attention to the cost of their actions (Coutlee et al., 2014). This ‘think
before you act’ behaviour may be a key mechanism that serves to override
engagement in positive cybersecurity practices. Individuals may engage in risky
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cybersecurity behaviours without fully establishing the cost of doing so, not only
for them but also the company for whom they work.
The Non-Planning element of impulsivity was found to be a significant negative
predictor for risky cybersecurity behaviours. This suggests that individuals who
plan for short-term and long-term goals, in turn less likely to rush to complete
activities, and in turn are not jeopardising cybersecurity as a result. These findings
differ from previous research which noted negative correlations between the sub-
scales of the BIS-11 and the SeBIS (Egelman and Peer, 2015a, b)). However
qualitative differences in the content of the scales used could be one potential
reason for the difference in results, and it suggested that further studies aim to
clarify this. It is also noted that impulsivity accounted for just 9% of the overall
variance in the data, suggesting that other factors could be contributing to the
difference in risky behaviours.
4.4. Limitations for the present study
There are a number of limitations attached to this study, a key one being the
reliance on self-reporting. Individuals who responded to the survey could have
answered in an attempt to portray a ‘perfect’ set of cybersecurity behaviours rather
than fully disclosing the true nature of their potential transgressions online. This in
part would mean that the risky cybersecurity behaviours individuals were admitting
to fails to fully tap into what they were actually doing on a day-to-day basis. The
only viable mechanism available to counter this would be to implement work-
based monitoring to record actual behaviours, which could in turn create more
serious issues related to the ethics of such a process.
The notion of risk compensation (Wilde, 1998) also presents a potential confound
in the context of the present study. The example often presented in the context of
risk compensation is the use of seat belts in automobiles. The logic here is that
drivers believe they are more protected by wearing a seat belt in contrast to not
wearing one, and therefore will take more risks. This has a direct link to
information security behaviours, particularly when the individual is in a place of
work. Many working environments employ information technology infrastructures
that are protected by a variety of technical countermeasures designed to prevent
potential breaches. As the individual believes they are more protected in the
workplace they may be inclined to take more risks, circumvent accepted protocols
and engage in poorer information security behaviours. This proposition is couched
very much in a tentative way, and there is need to explore this in more detail
through further research.
It is also noted that the use of the term ‘Internet addiction’ can present its own set
of issues, and in light of commentary presented by other researchers (Griffiths,
1998; Kuss et al., 2014) an awareness of such issues should be accepted in the
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interpretation of these findings. The actual evidence of pure Internet addiction is
limited, with only a small number of cases actually being reported (Kuss et al.,
2014). From this perspective further research is required to explore how
technology addiction as a whole serves to impact potentially risky cybersecurity
behaviours.
5. Conclusion
As the fight against susceptibility to cybercrime and the prevention of digital
attacks within businesses moves an emphasis away from technology towards
human factors, research of this nature becomes more and more important. The
present research highlights how aspects of personality, problematic Internet use
and employee attitudes can impact on the potential to engage in effective
information security behaviours. As a more systematic model of how individuals
are choosing to engage (or not) in good cybersecurity practices is developed, there
is the potential to create clearer communications packages or strategies to
proliferate these further. Some work has already been conducted in this area, with
research from Bada et al. (2014) noting that in order to be effective, key design
elements have to be adhered to. For instance the researchers noted that information
security education has to go beyond just providing information to users. In order to
circumvent this, it is suggested that information has to be targeted, has to be
actionable, relevant, and there must be the provision of feedback so that individuals
can assess how well they are performing (Bada et al., 2014). Such measures also
present the possibility for identifying those individuals who present a higher risk to
an organisation in terms of a lack of adherence to good cybersecurity practices,
allowing these individuals to be educated or trained further rather than punished.
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